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ANTICIPATORY ATTACKS ON SELECTIVE SERVICE
CLASSIFICATIONS
To the man registered with the Selective Service System, classi-
fication is of vital importance. "Classification is the key to selection," 1
and registrants classified I-A are available to be selected for active
service. A registrant may challenge his classification through an
administrative procedure. His first option is to request a personal
appearance before his local board2 If his plea is rejected here, he may
seek review by a state appeal board.4 If a member of this board dis-
sents from the majority's action, the registrant may make a final appeal
to the President of the United States.' Any further review must
occur in the courts.
I. HISTORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW BY ANTICIPATORY ATTACK
Judicial review of draft board classifications has traditionally been
sought in three types of suits: ' in a criminal prosecution for failure to
obey an induction order, in a petition for habeas corpus brought after
accepting induction, and in an anticipatory attack. The latter is a suit
brought by a registrant before he has to make the choice of either
violating his induction order or accepting induction. Although there
are different types of anticipatory attacks," they have the same object:
to secure a judicial determination that the registrant's classification
is invalid.
An anticipatory attack is the best form of judicial review from
the registrant's point of view. If the registrant chooses to await
criminal prosecution, he must risk a prison sentence of up to five years,
a fine of up to $10,000, or both.' If he chooses a petition for habeas
132 C.F.R. § 1622.1(b) (1968).
2 Id. § 1622.2. The prerequisites for the various classifications are described in
id. §§1622.10-.50.
Id. § 1624.1(a). The registrant must request the appearance within 30 days of
the date on which the board mailed the Notice of Classification. A similar 30 day
limit applies to other appeals within the system. See id. §§ 1626.2 (a), (c) (1), & § 1627.3.
4 Id. §§ 1626.2(a), (c) (1). Note that the registrant may appeal even though
he does not have a personal appearance.
5 Id. § 1627.3. The registrant may request his local board to reopen his classifica-
tion by submitting facts which, if true, would justify a reclassification; however,
reopening is discretionary with the local board. Id. § 1625.2.
1 One attack commonly brought after the registrant has been indicted for viola-
tion of his induction order is a petition for habeas corpus before accepting induction.
Because it is brought after indictment, it cannot be called a true anticipatory attack.
7 The most common types of anticipatory attacks are suits for an injunction,
e.g., Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956), a declaratory judgment,
e.g., Meredith v. Carter, 49 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Ind. 1943), and a common law writ
of certiorari, e.g., United States ex reL Roman v. Rauch, 253 F. 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1918).
8See 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (Supp. III, 1968). The common practice in these
cases is to offer a registrant found guilty the option of going into the military,
instead of serving a prison sentence. This lessens, but does not eliminate, the risk
involved in a criminal prosecution.
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corpus, he must undergo induction into the armed forces, with all of its
accompanying hardship.' By bringing an anticipatory attack, he
avoids these harsh alternatives. However, anticipatory attacks have
rarely succeeded.' 0 The most common reason given for dismissing the
registrants' suits was that the applicable draft law provided that the
Selective Service System's decision on classification was "final,"
thereby precluding judicial review."
A leading case which granted judicial review in an anticipatory
attack is Wolff v. Selective Service Local Board No. 16.12 Plaintiffs
were undergraduate students who took part in a demonstration held
at a local board against the Vietnam War. Because of this action they
were declared delinquent, lost their II-S student deferments,' 3 and
were reclassified I-A. Without appealing their reclassifications within
the Selective Service System or waiting for an order to report for
induction, they brought suit for a return of their deferments. The
district court dismissed for lack of a justiciable controversy. 14 The
court of appeals reversed, holding that an injunction could issue.'"
Partly in response to Wolff,' 6 Congress amended the draft law in
1967,17 adding to the previous provision on finality of classification to
the following:
No judicial review shall be made of the classification or
processing of any registrant by local boards, appeal boards, or
the President, except as a defense to a criminal prosecution
9 See note 92 infra and accompanying text.
-0 Prior to the Second Circuit's decision in Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd.
No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (1967), so few registrants bringing anticipatory attacks were
successful that judicial review by means of anticipatory attack was called an exception
to the rule allowing judicial review only as a defense to a criminal prosecution or in
a petition for habeas corpus after induction. Compare the successful attacks of
Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956); United States v. Mancuso,
139 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1943) ; and Tomlinson v. Hershey, 95 F. Supp. 72 (E.D. Pa.
1949) ; with the unsuccessful attacks in Koch v. Zuieback, 316 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1963) ;
Warren v. Abernathy, 198 F.2d 622 (10th Cir. 1952); Local Draft Bd. No. 1 v.
Connors, 124 F.2d 388 (9th Cir. 1941); United States ex rel. Beers v. Selective
Training & Serv. Local Bd. No. 1, 50 F. Supp. 39 (W.D. Wis. 1943); Allison v.
Local Bd. No. 61, 43 F. Supp. 896 (N.D. Cal. 1942); Shimola v. Local Bd. No. 42,
40 F. Supp. 808 (N.D. Ohio 1941); Dick v. Terlin, 37 F. Supp. 836 (S.D.N.Y.
1941) ; and Brown v. Spelman, 254 F. 215 (E.D.N.Y. 1918). Note, The Selective
Service, 76 YALE L.J. 160, 172-73 n.89 (1966); 81 HARv. L. Ray. 685, 686 & n.11
(1968).
"E.g., Meredith v. Carter, 49 F. Supp. 899 (N.D. Ind. 1943) ; Act of Sept. 16,
1940, ch. 720, § 10(a) (2), 54 Stat. 893.
12 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
13Both statute and regulation provide for this deferment: 50 U.S.C. App.
§456(h) (1) (Supp. III, 1968) ; 32 C.F.R. § 1 622.25(a) (1968).
14 372 F.2d at 820.
'5 Id.
16 Oestereich v. Selective Serv. System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 249 n.10
(1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See note 35 infra for a discussion of the effectiveness
of such Congressional action.
17Act of June 30, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-40, § 8(c), 81 Stat. 104, amending 50
U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (1964) (codified at 50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp.
III, 1968)).
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instituted under section 12 of this title, after the registrant
has responded either affirmatively or negatively to an order to
report for induction, or for civilian work in the case of a
registrant determined to be opposed to participation in war
in any form .... '
It is clear from the legislative history that this amendment was in-
tended to prevent a flood of anticipatory attacks in federal courts. 9
II. OESTEREICH AND GABRIEL
Two recent decisions radically changed the law governing antici-
patory attacks. The question no longer is whether these attacks shall
be allowed, but which anticipatory attacks shall be allowed. The cases
are Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Board No. 11 20 and
Clark v. Gabriel.2
The plaintiff in Oestereich, a divinity student, received from his
local board a IV-D classification, an exemption from service granted
to "students preparing for the ministry." 22 In an antiwar demon-
stration on October 16, 1967, he and several others returned their
Selective Service registration certificates to the government as a sign
of protest against the United States' participation in the war in Viet-
nam. Less than a month after the demonstration, he was declared a
IS50 U.S.C. App. § 460(b) (3) (Supp. III, 1968).
19 See H.R. REP. No. 267, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1967). By this amendment,
Congress also intended to eliminate judicial review before the registrant had ex-
hausted his administrative remedies. Id. See Peterson v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700,
701, relief granted, 289 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1968) ; Kimball v. Selective Serv.
Local Bd. No. 15, 283 F,. Supp. 606, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
However, as was conceded in Oestereich by the Solicitor General, habeas corpus
post-induction actions were not intended to be eliminated. 393 U.S. at 235.
Nevertheless the law remained unsettled in the lower federal courts. See, e.g.,
Zigmond v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 396 F.2d 290 (1st Cir.), application
for stay of induction denied, 391 U.S. 930 (1968); Moskowitz v. Kindt, 394 F.2d
648 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1014 (1969) ; Gabriel v. Clark, 287 F. Supp.
369 (N.D. Cal.), revd per curian, 393 U.S. 256 (1968); Petersen v. Clark, 285
F. Supp. 700, relief granted, 289 F. Supp. 949 (N.D. Cal. 1968) ; Kimball v. Selective
Serv. Local Bd. No. 15, 283 F. Supp. 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20393 U.S. 233 (1968).
21393 U.S. 256 (1968).
22 The exemption is provided for both by statute and by regulation. The statute,
50 U.S.C. App. §456(g) (1964), states:
[S]tudents preparing for the ministry under the direction of recognized
churches or religious organizations, who are satisfactorily pursuing full-time
courses of instruction in recognized theological or divinity schools ... shall be
exempt from training and service (but not from registration) under this title.
The regulation, 32 C.F.R. § 1622.43 (a) (3) states:
[Any registrant] [w]ho is a student preparing for the ministry under the
direction of a recognized church or religious organization and who is satis-
factorily pursing a full-time course of instruction in a recognized theological
or divinity school [shall be placed in Class IV-D] . . ..
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delinquent and reclassified I-A by his local board. 3  He appealed his
reclassification, but his I-A status was affirmed unanimously by the
appeal board. He was ordered to report for induction on January 24,
1968. Five days before that date, he filed suit in a district court,
seeking to enjoin induction. 4
The district court dismissed the suit, stating, among other reasons,
that section 10(b) (3) of the Military Selective Service Act of 1967 25
(limiting judicial review of Selective Service classifications to cases
involving criminal prosecutions) deprived the court of jurisdiction.2
The Tenth Circuit affirmed per curiam.27
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. In an opinion by
Justice Douglas the Court held that section 10(b) (3) cannot be read
to preclude pre-induction judicial review in a case in which the board
deprived a registrant of his statutory exemption by reclassifying him,
under authority of the delinquency regulations of the Selective Service
System, for reasons that are unrelated to the merits or conditions of the
exemption. The board reclassified plaintiff pursuant to the delin-
quency regulations which give a board discretionary authority to
classify or reclassify any registrant into Class I-A if he fails to perform
any duties required of him under Selective Service law.2' The asserted
failure of duty was twofold: (1) failure to have the registration card
in his possession; (2) failure to provide the board with notice of his
local status. The Court pointed out that these regulations were
promulgated by the Selective Service System, not by Congress, and
cannot be used to override a statute which clearly and unequivocally
provides that a divinity student shall be exempt from training and
service. The Court did not find in the language of the 1967 amend-
ment-" 'prime age group' means the age group . . . from which
selections for induction . . . are first to be made after delinquents and
volunteers" "9-- a delegation of authority to deprive a registrant of a
statutorily granted exemption on account of delinquency." Therefore,
if a registrant meets the qualifications and conditions set down in the
statute, the board has no authority to deprive him of the exemption
for reasons unrelated to those qualifications or conditions. Such a
23 The board's action may have been in response to a letter from Selective Service
Director Lewis B. Hershey urging local boards to reclassify and induct anti-draft
protestors. See Letter from Lt. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey to All Members of the
Selective Service System, Oct. 26, 1967, in N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1967, § 1, at 2, cols. 3-5.
24 These facts are taken from Brief for Petitioner at 5-7, Oestereich v. Selective
Serv. System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233 (1968).
25 50 U.S.C. App. §460(b) (3) (Supp. III, 1968).
26 280 F. Supp. 78 (D. Wyo. 1968).
27 390 F2d 100 (10th Cir. 1968).
28 The delinquency regulations are 32 C.F.R. §§ 1642.4(a), 1642.12 (1968).
29 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1) (Supp. III, 1968) (emphasis added).
30 Justice Douglas's opinion also suggests that even had Congress intended to
delegate authority to define the "delinquency" which could deprive a registrant of
statutorily granted exemptions, such delegation would be invalid if not accompanied
by proper standards to govern the boards' action. 393. U.S. at 237.
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deprivation would be an illegal assumption of power by the board. The
Court stated:
We deal with conduct of a local Board that is basically
lawless. It is no different in constitutional implications from
a case where induction of an ordained minister or other
clearly exempt person is ordered (a) to retaliate against the
person because of his political views or (b) to bear down on
him for his religious views or his racial attitudes or (c) to get
him out of town so that the amorous interests of a Board
member might be better served. [citation omitted] In such
instances, as in the present one, there is no exercise of dis-
cretion by a Board in evaluating evidence and in determining
whether a claimed exemption is deserved."'
Thus, the Court was faced with a situation in which (1) the
statute provided that plaintiff shall not be required to serve; (2) the
Selective Service System had nevertheless called him to report for
induction, and (3) section 10(b)(3) states that no judicial review
may be obtained prior to induction. To give effect to section 10(b) (3)
here would mean that plaintiff must either risk the hazards of a crim-
inal prosecution or consent to induction and seek habeas corpus relief
in order to defend an exemption given clearly and unconditionally by
statute. Finding the two statutory sections taken together to be out
of harmony with the Act as an organic whole,"2 the Court concluded
that section 10(b) (3) cannot be given a literal reading; to do so
would be "to construe the Act with unnecessary harshness." 3' Thus,
the Court held that judicial review was not precluded by the statute
in this situation.3"
Justice Harlan concurred in the result, reasoning that section
10(b) (3) was meant to deny judicial review only in cases where a
31 Id. at 237-38.
32 The Court actually said "[e]xamples are legion where literalness in statutory
language is out of harmony either with constitutional requirements . . . [citations
omitted] or with an Act taken as an organic whole," 393 U.S. at 238, but since no
further mention is made of constitutional grounds it is most likely the Court meant
the latter.
3 31d.
34 An interesting point is raised in the further disposition of the case. The Court
reversed and remanded "to the District Court where petitioner must have the oppor-
tunity to prove the facts alleged and also to demonstrate that he meets the jurisdic-
tional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331." 393 U.S. at 239. One of the jurisdictional
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a) (1964) is that the matter in controversy exceed
the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs. It will be difficult for
a plaintiff in a draft case to meet this requirement. See Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp.
561, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 393 U.S. 1112 (1969); id. at 567
(Edelstein, J., dissenting) ; Note, Draft Reclassification for Political Demonstratio;s_-
Jurisdictional Amou t in Suits Against Federal Officers, 53 CoMax.L L.Q. 916 (1968).
If this requirement were insisted upon, it could ban many anticipatory attacks and
substantially overrule Oestereich.
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plaintiff seeks to attack a board's findings of fact or mixed law-fact
questions,35 and not in cases where, as here, the plaintiff attacks the
board's regulations as invalid on their face and the procedures as un-
lawful. To deny judicial review of these questions prior to a depriva-
tion of liberty would "raise serious constitutional problems." "'
Justice Stewart, with whom Justices Brennan and White con-
curred, dissented on the ground that there is no conflict between plain-
tiff's exemption and the amendment. Given that the amendment is
constitutional, he stated that the Court ought not to disregard it merely
because it seems harsh. 
3
The meaning of Oestereich is uncertain. Intertwined in the de-
cision are two separate problems: (1) the proper scope of authority of
the Selective Service System, and (2) the degree of departure from
this standard which will permit a successful anticipatory attack on a
classification in the face of section 10(b) (3). One possible meaning
is that the delinquency regulations are invalid when used as a factor in
any classification because Congress has not authorized their use (or,
alternatively, that if the use was authorized, it is invalid because it is
not accompanied by proper standards). There is language in the
opinion to this effectY A second possibility is that the delinquency
regulations may not be used to deny a statutory "exemption." How-
ever, the use of the word "exemption" ought not carry great weight,
and the Court probably intended a third possibility, that the regulations
may not be used to deny any clear statutory right. It is the thesis of this
35 This view of the legislative history is not reconcilable with the view of Justice
Stewart that § 10(b) (3) was meant to prevent a recurrence of the Wolff decision.
Compare 393 U.S. at 241-42 with id. at 247. Justice Harlan notes that § 10(b) (3)
was "precipitated" by Wolff, id. at 245 n.7, but asserts that the Wolff case, and
others, merely involved claims that "the Selective Service boards had maladministered
or misapplied the applicable statutes or regulations, and not challenges to the validity
of the laws themselves." Id. In fact, Wolff involved allegations (1) that the local
board was not authorized to decide that a registrant had violated the criminal provi-
sions of § 12(a), 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1965), and thus was a delinquent who
could be classified I-A; and (2) that first and sixth amendment rights were being
violated. Wolff v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817, 820-22 (2d Cir.
1967). Both contentions were sustained. Id. at 820. Acting beyond jurisdiction
and infringing constitutional rights both go considerably beyond "maladministration,"
if that word means simply "making an administrative mistake."
However, Justice Stewart's view also seems in error. It appears that in Wolff,
the registrants were engaged in constitutionally protected activities. Id. See Zigmond
v. Selective Serv. Bd. No. 11, 396 F.2d 290, 292 (1st Cir.) stay of inductiom denied,
391 U.S. 930 (1968). Prompt action was held to be necessary to protect these rights.
372 F.2d at 820. If that is true, to the extent that the case rests on constitutional
grounds, the efforts of Congress to overrule it would be in vain; presumably Congress
would not attempt to pass unconstitutional legislation.
3 393 U.S. at 243 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan's constitutional
worries do not seem to be shared by the remainder of the Court. See note 32 rupra.
37 393 U.S. at 246-49 (Stewart, J., dissenting). justice Stewart notes that the
constitutionality of the § 10(b) (3) amendment was not challenged by the Court, and
that surrendering a draft card is not a constitutionally protected activity. Id. at 250
n.11, citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
3s See note 30 supra.
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Comment that this last possibility was the intention of the Court :39 that
anticipatory attack should be granted whenever the delinquency regu-
lations are used to deprive any registrant of a clear, mandatory statu-
tory right.
Gabriel, decided on the same day as Oestereich, throws some light
on the problem. In Gabriel, the plaintiff applied to his local board for
classification as a conscientious objector.40 Most of the evidence on
plaintiff's application appeared to concern his civil rights and antiwar
activities.4 ' The board rejected his application and classified him I-A.
He appealed unsuccessfully in administrative channels. Ordered to re-
port for induction, he brought suit to enjoin his induction and to have
the board's action declared improper. The case did not involve the
delinquency regulations, and the only issue was whether a registrant
could assert by anticipatory attack that a local board erred in its initial
classification, or whether he must wait and raise the issue in an action
for habeas corpus after induction,' or in a defense to a criminal
prosecution. The district court issued a preliminary injunction, hold-
ing that a requirement under section 10(b) (3) that a plaintiff risk
criminal penalties in order to obtain judicial review in this case would
be an unconstitutional denial of due process of law.43
The Supreme Court " reversed per curiam. The Court noted that
in this case, unlike Oestereich, the classification made by the board was
based solely on findings of fact concerning plaintiff's eligibility for the
status of conscientious objector. The opinion stated that
there is no doubt of the board's statutory authority to take
action which the appellee challenges, and that action in-
39 It is also a possibility that the Court merely meant that the combination of
factors in this particular case add up to such an outrageous result that in the very
clearest of cases the Court would permit anticipatory attack. Cf. Leedom v. Kyne,
358 U.S. 184 (1958) ; Boire v. Greyhound Corp., 376 U.S. 473, 480-81 (1964) ; Note,
43 TEx. L. Rr v. 251, 252 (1964). However, there is no suggestion in the language
of the opinion that the decision is thus limited. Furthermore, such an approach to
the abuses revealed in this case would very likely be ineffective to cure the problem,
considering the large number of local boards, and that instances of such abuse are
widespread.
4050 U.S.C. App. §456(j) (Supp. III, 1968) defines this exemption. Note that
this section sets no standards other than the exercise of discretion by the local board:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any person
to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed forces of the
United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participation in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the
term "religious training and belief" does not include essentially political,
sociological, or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code. Any
person claiming exemption from combatant training and service because of
such conscientious objections whose claim is sustained by the local board
shall, if he is inducted into the armed forces . . . be assigned to non-
combatant service . ...
41 See 393 U.S. at 260-64 (Douglas, J., concurring).
42 See note 19 suPra and accompanying text.
43 Gabriel v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 369 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
44 Direct appeal to the Supreme Court was available under 28 U.S.C. § 1252
(1965).
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escapably involves a determination of fact and an exercise of
judgment. . . . Here the board has exercised its statutory
discretion to pass on a particular request for classification,
"evaluating evidence and * * * determining whether a
claimed exemption is deserved." "
There are several distinctions from Oestereich suggested in this
passage. One is that in Gabriel there is no direct challenge to the
power of the board to act. In Oestereich there was no doubt about
the fact that the registrant was indeed qualified for the exemption
under the terms of the statute; the disputed point was whether, not-
withstanding this qualification, the board could take it away from
him. However, in Gabriel it is certain that a local board may pass on
the merits of a claim to the status of conscientious objector.4  But the
Court does not stop with that distinction; they go on to suggest a
second point, that a determination of fact was involved. The force
of this language is not certain. It may refer to the grounds given in
Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Oestereich that review of the
action of the board by anticipatory attack is prohibited when there is
involved a determination of fact or mixed fact and law. Such dis-
tinctions are difficult to make in practice. Moreover, the majority
opinion in Oestereich does not refer to such a distinction. More
plausible is the third suggestion that the board was involved in an
exercise of judgment, of statutory discretion, and that for this reason
the action of the board may not be made the subject of anticipatory
attack. However, the use of the word "discretion" is unusual. The
words of the statute are: "[a]ny person claiming exemption from
combatant training and service because of such conscientious objections
whose claim is sustained by the local board shall . . . be assigned to
noncombatant service . . . .". This is not a grant of discretion in
the ordinary sense of the word; the board, if it finds the claim sus-
tained, must assign the individual to noncombatant duties-that is, give
him a I-A-0 classification. The board may not sustain the claim-
that the individual is opposed to war in any form-and then decide
for other reasons that the individual should not be given a I-A-0
classification. Nevertheless, if the word discretion is taken to mean
a judgment on the existence of a fact (such as the sincerity of a
registrant's belief) so subjective that the quality of what is normally
thought of as discretion is approached, the use of the word is justified.
The distinction from Justice Harlan's theory is that some findings of
"fact," for instance, an arbitrary finding that a registrant was not a
student, might, under this theory, be subject to anticipatory attack.
4 8
45 393 U.S. at 258.
4 6 Id. See note 40 mtpra.
4750 U.S.C. App. §456(j) (Supp. III, 1968). See the quotation in note
40 supra.
48 Cf. text accompanying note 31 supra.
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After Oestereich and Gabriel some forms of anticipatory attack
are permissible and others are not. Oestereich was in many ways the
clearest case for permitting anticipatory attack in the face of the lan-
guage of section 10(b) (3). Once it has been decided that there is no
statutory authority to use the delinquency regulations to deny a statu-
tory right, one can say with some assurance that Congress, had they
thought about the problem, would not have meant that the aggrieved
registrant may obtain relief only in a defense to a criminal prosecution
or a petition for habeas corpus. Gabriel, on the other hand, is a very
clear case for not allowing anticipatory attack. Between these two
poles is the limit of the Oestereich decision, which this Comment sug-
gests is defined by the presence of an element of discretion in the
statutory power granted to the board. This theory must be evaluated
in the light of the later actions of federal appellate courts.
III. ANTICIPATORY ATTACE DECISIONS SINCE
OESTEREICH AND GABRIEL
Since Oestereich and Gabriel, the Supreme Court has decided two
cases of anticipatory attack, but neither decision illuminated the ques-
tion of the extension of the Oestereich doctrine.49 Three courts of
appeals decisions, however, have squarely faced this question.
The Eighth Circuit in Kolden v. Selective Service Local Board
No. 4 50 held that allowance of pre-induction judicial review does not
extend to reclassification of deferred graduate students."' The plain-
tiff, a graduate student at Harvard University, turned in his draft card
to the Government on October 16, 1967. On December 1, he was
declared delinquent and reclassified I-A pursuant to the Selective
Service System's delinquency regulations 2 for failure to have his
registration card in his possession. His appeal was denied, and on
February 1, 1968, he was ordered to report for induction. On February
22, he brought suit to enjoin his induction. The district court denied
a motion for temporary injunction on the ground that section 10 (b) (3)
49 See Moskovitz v. Kindt, 394 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1014
(1969) ; Boyd v. Clark, 287 F. Supp. 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd per curiam (without
reaching the jurisdictional question raised under 28 U.S.C. § 1331), 393 U.S. 1112
(1969). In Moskowitz, the board based its decision on evidence relating to the merits
of plaintiff's II-S classification. Boyd was not even a suit for a classification; plain-
tiffs, all of whom conceded that they were properly classified I-A, brought suit chal-
lenging the constitutionality of student deferments. Cf. Muhammed Ali v. Breathitt,
268 F. Supp. 63 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
50 406 F.2d 631 (8th Cir. 1969).
51The statute authorizing graduate student deferments is 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 456(h) (2) (Supp. III, 1968) :
Except as otherwise provided in this subsection the President is authorized,
under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, to provide for the
deferment from training and service in the Armed Forces of any or all
categories of persons . . . whose activity in graduate study . . . is found to
be necessary to the maintenance of the national health, safety, or interest ....
5232 C.F.R. §§ 1642A(a), 1642.12 (1968).
1969]
908 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
at this point barred a review of the merits. The court of appeals
granted an injunction pending determination of plaintiff's appeal and
deferred decision until the Supreme Court decided Oestereich. Upon
consideration of Oestereich and Gabriel, the court held that the district
court was correct in denying the injunction, and that the "exception"
to section 10(b) (3) afforded Oestereich is not applicable to graduate
deferments.
The court reasoned that a graduate deferment is not required by
statute but rather is a matter of discretion that rests with local board,
and thus is similar to the conscientious objector determination in
Gabriel. The conclusion that graduate deferments are discretionary
was arrived at by examining the statutory language concerning the
graduate student deferment and comparing it with that of the under-
graduate deferment in the same section. The operative language of
the latter is that "the President shall, under such rules and regulations
as he may prescribe, provide for the deferment," " while that of the
former is that "the President is authorized, under such rules and regu-
lations as he may prescribe, to provide for the deferment." " The
court considered the undergraduate classification to be statutorily re-
quired, but thought the graduate classification a matter of adminis-
trative grace, granted only at the discretion of the local board. Conse-
quently, the Oestereich holding does not extend to graduate deferments.
The Kolden court carefully stated that they were not deciding the
case of an undergraduate student deferment, but strongly implied that
they would extend Oestereich to undergraduate student deferments. 5
However, the Second Circuit in Breen v. Selective Service Local Board
No. 16"' reached the opposite conclusion in holding that Oestereich
does not extend to undergraduate student deferments.
The plaintiff in Breen was an undergraduate music student at the
Berkely School of Music in Boston, and held a n-S deferment. In
November 1967, he gave his registration certificate to a clergyman in
Boston as a protest of the Vietnam War. On January 9, 1968, his
local board declared him delinquent for failure to have his registration
certificate in his possession, and reclassified him I-A. He appealed
within the Selective Service System and simultaneously brought suit
in the District Court for Connecticut, asking for an injunction, dam-
ages, and a declaration that the Board's action was null and void. The
district court dismissed the suit on the grounds that section 10(b) (3)
deprived the court of jurisdiction.5" Subsequently, his administrative
appeal failed, and he was ordered to report for induction.
5350 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1) (Supp. i1, 1968).
54 Id. § 456(h) (2).
-5 406 F.2d at 634, 635.
56 406 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. granted, 37 U.S.L.W. 3407 (U.S. Apr. 28,
1969).
57 284 F. Supp. 749 (D. Conn. 1968).
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The court of appeals stayed the order to report and deferred its
opinion until Oestereich had been decided. After the decision, the
dismissal was affirmed. Judge Friendly distinguished Oestereich on
the grounds that Oestereich had a statutory right to an "exemption"
which could not be denied him through use of the delinquency regu-
tions, whereas Breen had a mere "deferment" which was granted
"under such rules and regulations as [the President] may prescribe." 5'
Since Executive Order No. 11360 " authorizes removal of a registrant
from II-S classification on a declaration of delinquency, it follows that
the board is within its statutory power in doing so. Further, the court
did not find the sentence in the statute-" [s] tudent deferments . . .
may be substantially restricted or terminated . . . only upon a finding
by [the President] that the needs of the Armed Forces require such
action" 0--to be a prohibition of the use of delinquency regulations
for reclassification, because Congress specifically recognized in the last
sentence of the section that "delinquents and volunteers" are first in
induction priority. The court concluded that there is nothing in the
statute granting the deferment that would be inconsistent with the use
of the delinquency regulations to withdraw it. This being so, the
action by the board in reclassifying plaintiff was not unlawful and
therefore not subject to pre-induction judicial review.
Judge Feinberg wrote a strong dissent. He pointed out that the
statute provides explicitly that the deferment shall continue until the
student either graduates, fails to pursue his studies satisfactorily, or
reaches his twenty-fourth birthday; and that the deferments shall not
be restricted or terminated unless the President finds it necessary for
the needs of the Armed Forces. These two factors provide a clear
statement of congressional intent, and Judge Feinberg read them as
providing no lesser statutory immunity from induction than in
Oestereich. He distinguished Gabriel, on the grounds that in Gabriel
the registrant's classification necessarily involved an exercise of both
fact-finding judgment and discretion by the board, whereas in Breen
the classification (as in Oestereich) depends solely on whether the
student is in school, and is not conditioned on a finding of fact that
must be sustained by the board. Judge Feinberg could find no basis
for distinguishing Breen from Oestereich.
The exemption-deferment distinction was also made in Anderson
v. Hershey.0 ' In that case nineteen registrants; formerly classified in
classes I-A, II-S (undergraduate student), I-Y (registant unable to
satisfy physical or mental standards for I-A, I-A-O, or 1-0, but who
could serve in time of national emergency), and III-A (registrant with
child or children or deferred because of hardship to dependents), were
58 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1) (Supp. III, 1968).
Z9 32 Fed. Reg. 9787, 9794 (1967).
'0 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1) (Supp. III, 1968).
61 No. 18976 (6th Cir., Apr. 11, 1969).
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reclassified under the delinquency regulations. It is not stated in the
opinion, but apparently the asserted delinquency was abandonment or
mutilation of draft cards. The court discussed specifically the II-S de-
ferments, and then applied the logic a fortiori to the other categories.
The court found a difference between an exemption and a deferment,
and found it reasonable for the purposes of anticipatory attack: "An
exempt person is predetermined to be outside the system; a deferred
person is within the system. We deem this a significant line of de-
marcation." 62 The court found that there was considerable interest
in insuring that those who were deferred, and still within the system,
complied with the regulations of the Selective Service, and that, there-
fore, the use of the delinquency regulations to reclassify a registrant is
justified. The court also found Congressional support for this power
in the age group language, as well as in the explicit power granted to
draft delinquent reserve members. One judge dissented on the grounds
that the delinquency regulations were punitive and therefore invalid.
The Breen and Aniderson courts erred in placing so great an
emphasis on the verbal distinction between an exemption and a de-
ferment. An exemption's importance lies not in its being an "ex-
emption" but in its being a statutory mandate. Since Oestereich's
exemption was required by statute, the local board could not withdraw
it for reasons unrelated to the merits of the classification. So here,
the statute mandates a student deferment for those registrants who
meet the requirements:
[T]he President shall, under such rules and regulations as
he may prescribe, provide for the deferment from training
and service in the Armed Forces of persons satisfactorily
pursuing a full-time course of instruction at a college, uni-
versity, or similar institution of learning and who request
such deferment."
If the "rules and regulations" include the Selective Service System's
delinquency regulations under which Breen's deferment was withdrawn,
then the President has the statutory authority to terminate under-
graduate student deferments for any number of reasons. However,
Congress has declared the conditions for termination of the student
deferment:
A [student] deferment . . . shall continue until such person
completes the requirements for his baccalaureate degree, fails
to pursue satisfactorily a full-time course of instruction, or
attains the twenty-fourth anniversary of the date of his birth,
whichever first occurs. Student deferments provided for
under this paragraph may be substantially restricted or ter-
6
2 Id. at 4.
6350 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1) (Supp. III, 1968).
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minated by the President only upon a finding by him that the
needs of the Armed Forces require such action.6"
The clause requiring the President to provide student deferments
"under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe" merely author-
izes the President to devise a workable system. It does not grant
power to apply delinquency regulations, or any other set of conditions,
that alter the congressional scheme. The statutory section granting
student deferments ends by requiring that registrants whose student
deferments have terminated be placed in the "prime age group," defined
as that
age group which has been designated by the President as the
age group from which selections for induction into the Armed
Forces are first to be made after delinquents and volunteers
Nevertheless, congressional recognition that some persons are to be
classed as "delinquents" is not authority for terminating a deferment
under conditions other than those set out by Congress. "Delinquents"
placed first in the order of call more likely refers to those individuals
who have failed entirely to register or have refused to report for a
physical, and who are then found on the merits of their own case to be
in class I-A.
In contrast to the Breen court, the court in Kolden correctly
recognized that the Oestereich holding applies to deferments provided
under statutory language, such as "the President shall provide for the
deferment" (as in undergraduate deferments), but does not apply to
deferments in which "the President is authorized to provide for the
deferment" (as in graduate student deferments). An examination
of all the statutory language supports this conclusion.
IV. THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE
A survey of the statutes providing deferments and exemptions re-
veals that most of the relevant language is couched in terms of com-
mand, such as: "no person shall be inducted"; 6 "no person shall be
liable for induction"; 7 "no local board shall order for induction any
person." "s However, the language of a few sections permits dis-
cretionary granting of deferments, for example: "any person may be
exempted"; " "the President is authorized to provide for the defer-
64 Id.
0Id.
66 Id. §§454(a), (c)(3), (i)(1), (k)(8) (1964).
,07 Id. §§454(i)(1), (6); 456(b)(1), (2), (3), (4); 456(c)(2) (A) (1964 &
Supp. III, 1968).
68 Id. §§455(a) (1) (1), (1) (2) (Supp. III, 1968).
69 Id. §456(a) (1) (Supp. III, 1968).
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ment"; 70 and "it is the sense of Congress that the President shall
provide for the deferment." 7' In addition to the generally prevailing
language of command, a number of sections set forth specific conditions
for the termination of the classifications,"' which imply that the classi-
fications are to be terminated only upon the happening of one of those
conditions. An example of such a specific section is that section
covering undergraduate student deferments, discussed above.73  If the
statutory language mandates granting a specific classification, a local
board should be held to lack statutory authority to reclassify a registrant
otherwise qualifying for that classification. Consequently, reclassi-
fication contrary to statutory language of mandate would be "basically
lawless," " and Oestereich should allow preinduction judicial review.
However, authorized but non-mandatory classifications and decisions
of fact involving statutory discretion, as in Gabriel, would not be sub-
ject to anticipatory attack. This is not to say that use of the de-
linquency regulations to withdraw such classifications is necessarily law-
ful; but attacks thereon must be limited to habeas corpus and defense
of a criminal prosecution. Thus a graduate student deferment, such
as in Kolden, which involves an element of discretion would correctly
be held to be immune from anticipatory attack.
The distinction drawn in Breen and Anderson between exemptions
and deferments is not useful. The statute does not always specify
which classifications are exemptions and which are deferments, 7' and
the regulations do not clarify the matter. 6  Some classifications, other
than I-A, appear to be neither.7 Moreover, the statutes do not make
a rational distinction between deferments and exemptions. Judge
Coffin in Anderson argues that the exemption-deferment distinction
separates those who are "within" from those who are "without" the
system.' Within the class of exemptions are divinity students and
ministers,79 conscientious objectors,80 and students at military colleges
(both government owned and private),." Within the class of defer-
ments are undergraduate students,"2 members of ROTCS3 members of
701d. §§454(i) (2); 456(h) (2) (1964 & Supp. I1, 1968).
71 Id. §§ 454(i) (3) ; 456(d) (4) (1964).
72 E.g., id. §§454(a), (c) (2), (k) (8) ; 456(d) (1), (i) (1), (i) (2) ; 456(h) (1)
(1964 & Supp. III, 1968).
73 See text accompanying notes 56-65 supra.
74 Oestereich v. Selective Service System Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 237
(1968).
75 See 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (Supp. III, 1968).
76 See 32 C.F.R. §§ 1622.2 -22.50 (1968).
77 E.g., 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(a) (2) (Supp. III, 1968) (commissioned officers of
Public Health Service).78 No. 18976 at 4.
7950 U.S.C. App. §456(g) (1964).
80 Id. § 456(j). The exemption is not from registration or induction, but from
combatant duty.
81 Id. § 456(a) (1).
82 Id. § 456(h) (1).
83 Id. §456(d) (1) (1964).
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the National Guard and Reserves,' the Vice-President, state governors,
state and federal judges and legislators,-' and those with dependency or
hardship problemsS It may be argued that exemptions are granted
to registrants because of employment, or some other presumably
permanent status, and deferments are granted to registrants with a
more transitory status. But this theory does not explain why a federal
judge is deferred, while a divinity student is exempted; or why an
ROTC member is deferred, while a West Point cadet is exempted.
Furthermore, even if a rational deferment-exemption distinction
could be found, it ought not to be determinative of the issue of granting
anticipatory attack. There is no reason why a clearly exempted
minister should be allowed anticipatory attack upon delinquency re-
classification, while a clearly deferred undergraduate student is denied
the remedy. Assuming that both have been granted the right by
Congress, the fact that one is presumed to be available shortly for
service should be irrelevant to his right to contest unlawful action.
Judge Coffin suggests that those deferred, and especially under-
graduates, should not be prosecuted for infractions of Selective Service
law, and that it is preferable to have available the less stringent remedy
of reclassification.s7 Perhaps this is so. The question is, has Congress
made that decision? To provide Congressional support for such use
of the delinquency regulations, Judge Coffin cites the "prime age
group" passage,sS but the Supreme Court in Oestereich rejected this
clause as a source of such power.8' Moreover, there is language in
Oestereich indicating that any such use of the delinquency regulations
was not and cannot be authorized."
V. CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE
Under pre-Oestereich review procedures, the registrant was ap-
parently limited to review in a defense to a criminal prosecution for
disobeying his induction notice or in a habeas corpus proceeding after
induction. The burden of undergoing a criminal trial is obvious. The
registrant must not only risk the possibility of criminal punishment,91
4 1 Id. § 456(c) (2) (A) (Supp. 11, 1968).
8ld. §456(f) (1964).
86Id. §456(h) (2) (Supp. III, 1968).
S No. 18976 at 5-6.
88 d. at 8 citing 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(h) (1) (Supp. III, 1968). See text
accompanying note 65 supra.
89 393 U.S. at 237. Judge Coffin suggests this rejection is applicable only to use
of the regulations to deny an exemption. See No. 18976 at 8 n.12. But he cites no
evidence to show that Congress had made such a distinction.
00 393 U.S. at 237. Judge Coffin also cites a provision pertaining to reservists or
National Guard members who fail "to serve satisfactorily during [the] period of
service." No. 18976 at 8-9, citing 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(c) (2) (D) (Supp. III, 1968).
However, he admits that this provision is equivocal. No. 18976 at 8-9.
91 See U.S.C. App. § 462 (Supp. III, 1968).
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but he must also face the notoriety of a criminal trial. The burden of
submitting to induction involves both pre- and post-induction dis-
location. If employed, he must quit his job; if a student, he must
leave school; if a farmer, he must sell his crops. Once inducted, he
faces even greater dislocation in the armed forces .9
2
On the other hand, Congress must raise and support armies and
must be able, through the Selective Service System, to exercise this
power speedily.13 In times of all-out war, the survival of the country
may depend on the efficiency of the Selective Service; if anticipatory
attacks would cause appreciable delay in raising armies, they ought
to be discouraged. 4
Congress spoke to this conflict by enacting section 10(b) (3). The
Court, interpreting this enactment in Oestereich, has said in effect
that Congress cannot have meant to bar anticipatory attack when a
clear statutory right has been flouted. If Congress meant to confine
arguments on the merits of classifications to administrative channels
and to allow afterwards only the smallest opportunity for judicial re-
view in order to minimize litigious stalling of induction, the Court's in-
terpretation is consonant with Congressional intent. However, when the
Selective Service acts lawlessly, as opposed to erroneously, correction
of the error is not best left in their hands. Furthermore, having
assumed that a clear statutory right has been violated, little litigation
is necessary. If the right is all that clear, the case will be over quickly.
92 This dislocation was classically described by Mr. Justice Murphy, concurring
in Estep v. United States:
[T]his remedy [habeas corpus after induction] may be quite illusory in many
instances. It requires one first to enter the armed forces and drop every
vestige of civil rights.... The proceeding must be brought in the jurisdiction
in which the person is then detained by the military, which may be thousands
of miles removed from his home, his friends, his counsel, his local board and
the witnesses who can testify in his behalf. Should he overcome all these
obstacles and possess enough money to proceed further, he still faces the
possibility of being shifted by the military at a moment's notice into another
jurisdiction, thus making the proceeding moot. There is little assurance,
moreover, that the military will treat his efforts with sympathetic under-
standing. These practical difficulties may thus destroy whatever efficacy
the remedy might otherwise have and cast considerable doubt on the assump-
tion that habeas corpus proceedings necessarily guarantee due process of law
to inductees.
327 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring).
9 Congress's power to raise and support armies is clearly stated in the Consti-
tution. U.S. CoNsT. art I, § 8.
That the Selective Service System must be able to exercise Congress's power to
raise armies speedily has been repeatedly emphasized in judicial considerations con-
cerning the draft. E.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968) ; Falbo
v. United States, 320 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1944). For further discussion, see Reisner,
The Conscientiols Objector E.xemption: Administrative Procedures and Judicial
Review, 35 U. Cui. L. R-y. 686, 719 (1968); Comment, Fairzess and Due Process
Under the Selective Service System, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1014, 1018 (1966).
9 Establishing 2 systems of review of draft classifications, the existing one for
wartime and the proposed one for peacetime, might be an effective means of insuring
the continued efficiency of the draft system while providing review of classifications
whenever possible. The mechanics of such a dual system are suggested in Comment,
Fairness and Due Process Under the Selective Service System, supra note 93 at 1018.
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Interpretation of the exemption-deferment line as the limit of
Oestereich is not consistent with this view of Congressional intent.
Anticipatory attack on lawless conduct which revokes deferments is no
more provocative of litigious stalling than an attack on a revoked ex-
emption. The number of suits might increase, but only if the un-
authorized practices of the Selective Service continue. 5  On the other
hand, drawing the line at the clear right-discretion distinction imple-
ments the Congressional intent. If the allegedly flouted right is not in
fact clear, or if it involves elements of discretion, the trial could bog
down in substantive arguments, and could more easily be used as a
stalling tactic. Use of the delinquency regulations to revoke any classi-
fication may be invalid. But limiting anticipatory attack on their use
to clear cases will not frustrate Congress's purpose and will provide
prompt and adequate relief to those aggrieved by egregious statutory
transgressions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Oestereich will stand as a milestone in the history of judicial re-
view of Selective Service classifications. It marks the farthest extent
to date of judicial control over the Selective Service. Before
Oestereich, the Supreme Court sanctioned review of classifications only
in a defense to a criminal prosecution or in a petition for habeas corpus
after induction. Now there may also be review of classifications in
certain anticipatory attacks. Oestereich should be interpreted to en-
compass only grants of classifications statutorily mandated, but not non-
mandatory or discretionary classifications. Limiting pre-induction
judicial review to this extent will correct the clearest transgressions of
the Selective Service and alleviate obviously aggrieved registrants,
without flouting Congressional purpose.
0 A very strong argument against any increase in the number of anticipatory
attacks is that such action would open the courts to a flood of registrants suing
to enjoin inductions, thereby disrupting the Selective Service System and causing
delay in raising armies. To date, the Supreme Court in Oestereich has clearly opened
the courts to only a trickle of registrants: those whose exemptions have been with-
drawn solely on the authority of the delinquency regulations.
Interpreting Oestereich to allow anticipatory attacks wherever the statute man-
dated a specific classification undoubtedly would increase the amount of litigation over
classifications. A number of registrants who do not now seek judicial review would
probably use an anticipatory attack if the route were open to them. However,
assuming that this increase in the number of anticipatory attacks is limited to those
cases in which there has been clearly unauthorized action, the additional opportunity
to litigate is justified. Moreover, a recent statute eliminates any possible advantage
to students from litigating beyond their twenty-sixth birthday, normally the cut-off
age for liability for the draft, thus reducing the possibility that judicial review may
be used as a stalling device. 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 454(a), 456(h) (1) (Supp. III, 1968).
Other conditions which could limit availability of anticipatory attacks are sug-
gested in Comment, Tlidicial Review of Selective Service Action: A Need for Reform,
56 CAIIF. L. REV. 448, 463-64 (1968).
96See, e.g., Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375, 377 (1955).
1969]
